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 Abstract 
 
The traditional definition of anaphora in purely co-textual terms as a relation between 
two co-occurring expressions is in wide currency in theoretical and descriptive studies 
of the phenomenon. Indeed, it is currently adopted in on-line psycholinguistic 
experiments on the interpretation of anaphors, and is the basis for all computational 
approaches to automatic anaphor resolution (see Mitkov, 2002). Under this conception, 
the anaphor, a referentially-dependent expression type, requires “saturation” by an 
appropriate referentially-autonomous, lexically-based expression —the antecedent— in 
order to achieve full sense and reference.  
 However, this definition needs to be re-examined in the light of the ways in 
which real texts operate and are understood, where the resulting picture is rather 
different. The article aims to show that the co-textual conception is misconceived, and 
that anaphora is essentially an integrative, discourse-creating procedure involving a 
three-way relationship between an “antecedent trigger”, an anaphoric predication, and a 
salient discourse representation of a situation. It is shown that it is only in terms of a 
dynamic interaction amongst the interdependent dimensions of text and discourse, as 
well as context, that the true complexity of anaphoric reference may be satisfactorily 
described. The article is intended as a contribution to the broader debate which has been 
going on within the pages of this journal and elsewhere between the formalist and the 
functionalist accounts of language structure and use. 
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1. Introduction 
 
There is currently a fundamental difference of conception and approach in the literature 
on anaphora as to its nature, functioning and status. The aim of this article is to clarify 
this difference and to spell out the implications of both types of account for the 
conception of language and its use that each assumes, as well as for a realistic 
description of this context-bound referring procedure. The discussion will be situated 
within the current debate between the dominant formalist and functionalist accounts of 
language structure and use, as represented within the pages of this journal notably by 
Newmeyer (2005) and Butler (2006), respectively. The predominant conception in 
theoretical and descriptive studies of the phenomenon, as well as in on-line 
psycholinguistic experiments on the interpretation of anaphors and computational 
approaches to automatic anaphor resolution, is the co-textual one: this holds that in 
order to interpret a given anaphor, it has first to be paired with an appropriate co-
occurring textual antecedent expression. But another approach is fast developing, which 
places emphasis on the tracking of given referents in the interlocutors’ respective 
evolving discourse models of the communicative event. This is the discourse-functional 
account of anaphoric reference.  
The structure of the article is as follows. After a preliminary statement of the 
three-way distinction amongst the interdependent notions of text, context and discourse 
(this section), section 2 characterises the two approaches to be compared and contrasted 
(the “co-textual” and the “discourse-functional” ones); the comparison is situated within 
the broader debate between formalism and functionalism in current Linguistics. Section 
3 gives an outline of the anaphora/deixis distinction in terms of a continuum of 
indexicality, seen from the discourse-functional viewpoint, and explores how these 
indexical referring procedures are related. Section 4 then attempts to characterise 
anaphora within a discourse framework, highlighting the discourse-level factors to 
which the procedure is sensitive; while section 5 revisits the account of anaphora given 
in Cornish (1999), developing in particular the distinction presented there between the 
notions of antecedent trigger and antecedent. The way in which anaphora operates in 
texts will be shown to require a complex of interactions amongst an antecedent-trigger, 
an evolving discourse representation, and the implementation of one or more integrative 
coherence relations initiated in terms of the anaphoric predication as a whole.  
To start, let us draw a crucial three-way distinction amongst the notions of text, 
context and discourse. This distinction will prove central to the discussion to come. See 
Table 1 below: 
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Text Context Discourse 
The connected sequence of 
verbal signs and non-verbal 
signals in terms of which 
discourse is co-constructed by 
the discourse partners in the act 
of communication.  
The context (the domain of 
reference of a given text, the co-
text, the discourse already 
constructed upstream, the genre of 
speech event in progress, the socio-
cultural environment assumed by 
the text, and the specific utterance 
situation at hand) is subject to a 
continuous process of construction 
and revision as the discourse 
unfolds. It is by invoking an 
appropriate context that the 
addressee or reader may create 
discourse on the basis of the 
connected sequence of textual cues 
that is text.  
The product of the hierarchical, 
situated sequence of utterance, 
indexical, propositional and 
illocutionary acts carried out in 
pursuit of some communicative 
goal, and integrated within a 
given context.  
 
 
Table 1. The respective roles of text, context and discourse (Cornish, 2008:Table 1, p. 998, revised) 
 
The text is the trace of at least one utterance act (whether realized in terms of a verbal, 
linguistic trace, or of a non-verbal one – which may be gestural, sensori-perceptual or 
prosodic). Among the relevant non-verbal signals are gaze direction, winks, raising of 
the eyebrows and pointing gestures of various kinds; while in the written form they 
include underlining, italics, boldface, punctuation, paragraphing and layout generally. 
Text, then, refers to the connected sequences of signs and signals, under their 
conventional meanings, produced by the speaker and (in informal spoken interactions) 
by the addressee. Certain of these signals point to possible ways of grounding the 
discourse to be constructed within a particular context, in cognitive terms. These signals 
correspond to what Gumperz (1992a: 234) calls “contextualization cues” (see also Auer, 
1992, as well as Gumperz, 1992b). For Bezuidenhout (2004), the grammatical 
morphemes within the linguistically-coded elements in text would be types of 
procedural devices, potentially signalling grounding (here, the invocation of relevant 
contextual assumptions). The author contrasts this class of devices with declarative 
(concept-denoting) signs, as is standard practice within Relevance theory. We may 
extend the procedural category to include the semiotically-relevant non-verbal elements 
mentioned above. For Verhagen (2005:22), “linguistic expressions are primarily cues 
for making inferences, and understanding does not primarily consist in decoding the 
precise context of the expressions, but in making inferences that lead to adequate next 
(cognitive, conversational, behavioural) moves.” 
 The discourse partners exploit this trace by simultaneously invoking an 
appropriate context, in cognitive terms, in order to construct discourse. The context 
relevant for a given act of utterance is a composite of the surrounding co-text, the 
domain of discourse at issue, the genre of speech event in progress, the situation of 
utterance, the discourse already constructed upstream and the wider socio-cultural 
environment presupposed by the text. It is in constant development: the discourse 
derived via the text both depends on it and at the same time changes it as this is 
constructed on line.  
The context invoked will serve to select the relevant sense of given lexemes, will 
narrow these down so as to be compatible with the discourse already constructed, and in 
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general will act to disambiguate potentially multiple possible interpretations of given 
textual segments. The context will also make it possible to flesh out elliptical or 
indeterminate references in the co-text, and to expand allusions made in the text to 
aspects of real-world knowledge. Furthermore, it will help the recipient to determine the 
illocutionary force of each incoming clause. See Asher & Lascarides (1996), Fetzer 
(2004), Connolly (2007) and Cornish (2009a) for developments of certain of these 
aspects.  
 Discourse, on the other hand, refers to the hierarchically structured, mentally 
represented product of the sequence of utterance, propositional, illocutionary and 
indexical acts that the participants are jointly carrying out as the communication 
unfolds. Such sequences have as their prime objective the realization of a local and/or 
global communicative goal of some kind. Discourse, then, is both hierarchical and 
defeasible (a provisional, and hence revisable, construction of a situated interpretation), 
whereas text is essentially linear – though in the spoken medium, paralinguistic, non-
verbal signals may well co-occur simultaneously with the flow of verbal signs and 
signals. Discourse clearly depends both on text and context. It is the discourse 
constructed in terms of the text and a relevant context which is capable of being stored 
subsequently in long-term memory for possible retrieval at some later point. The textual 
trace of the communicative event, for its part, is short-lived, disappearing from short-
term memory once that discourse is constructed — or very soon thereafter (cf. Jarvella, 
1979). See also Ariel (2008: 2), Langacker (1996: 334) and Widdowson (2004: 8). Text, 
context and discourse, then, are interdependent, interactive and inter-defining. 
 
2. The co-textual vs. discourse-dependent approaches to discourse anaphora 
 
2.1 The textualist account of anaphora 
 
Huang (2000: 1) gives a purely formal definition of anaphora in terms of textually co-
occurring pairs of expressions:  
 
(1) a “In contemporary linguistics, [the term anaphora is] a relation between 
two or more linguistic elements, wherein the interpretation of one (called 
an anaphoric expression) is in some way determined by the interpretation 
of the other (called an antecedent)”.  
 
A similar definition is given by Barss (2003: ix):  
 
(1)   b “Broadly construed, the term anaphora is used to cover myriad disparate 
cases of a linguistic expression receiving part, or all, of its semantic 
interpretation via a dependency upon an antecedent, rather than from its 
internal lexical content.” 
  
This conception of anaphora is one that is accepted as valid by linguists taking a 
basically formal-syntactic view of language structure, as input to a formal semantics and 
(enriched by an appropriate semantic interpretation), to a (formal) pragmatics. It is 
shared by pragmaticians such as Levinson (2000) and formal-semanticists such as 
Corblin (1995) – and even, in broad terms, by certain functionalist linguists such as 
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Halliday & Hasan (1976), Martin (1992) and Dik (1997, Part II: Ch. 10).1 These 
linguists conceive the resolution of anaphors in terms of a binary (or n-ary, where there 
is more than one coreferring anaphor) relation holding between expressions occurring in 
some co-text. In definition (1a), the anaphoric relation (and hence, resolution) takes 
place solely at the level of the co-text (“…a relation between two or more linguistic 
elements…” —my emphasis, FC); while in definition (1b), the anaphor is said to be 
“dependent [for] its semantic interpretation” on an “antecedent”: we may assume this to 
be a co-occurring linguistic expression, as in definition (1a), though this is not explicitly 
stated as such.  
Given this conception, the chief concern of textualists has been to pinpoint the 
formal as well as semantic constraints allowing or prohibiting the bringing into relation 
of the two expression tokens: for example, matching morpho-syntactic feature values 
(where the anaphor is a 3rd person ordinary or reflexive pronoun); establishing the 
syntactic or semantic c-command configurations or the application of the relevant GB 
Binding Theory Conditions (for example) in which each expression token is involved, 
and ascertaining semantic2 as well as pragmatic constraints. In Generative accounts, the 
relation has tended to be characterised in terms of coreference rather than anaphora —
referential dependency— per se; though in the case of the Binding Theory Conditions 
within GB, “anaphors” (a highly restricted use of this term within this model) are 
defined as non-referring, inherently bindable variable-like expressions—e.g. reflexive 
and reciprocal pronouns: see Binding Condition A (Chomsky, 1986: 166, item (216)).  
Lying behind this approach is an essentially truth-functional conception of 
utterances, where language primarily serves a representational role —describing 
situations in some world and conveying propositional information: for the concern of 
such linguists is to specify the extension or reference of referentially-dependent, non-
autonomous expressions (anaphors, under the broad conception of the term), by 
transferring to them the sense and/or reference of a suitable textual antecedent 
expression. Linguists adopting this view of anaphora tacitly assume that, in order to 
describe and account for some phenomenon, it is first necessary to characterise its 
mechanics — that is, the ways in which it may be realised, independently of its possible 
uses in discourse. 
This is made explicit by Newmeyer (1998: 7), who characterizes the formalist 
approach to language as follows: “One orientation sees as a central task for linguists 
characterizing the formal relationships among grammatical elements independently of 
any characterization of the semantic and pragmatic properties of those elements.” (See 
Newmeyer, 1998; 2005 and Butler, 2006 for details of the debate between formalist and 
functionalist approaches to the study of language). As far as the discourse-functional, 
pragmatic dimension of anaphoric reference is concerned, although formalist-textualist 
linguists recognize it (e.g. Mitkov, 2002: 32-34), they do not frame their accounts in 
                                                
1 See Brown & Yule (1983) for a critique of Halliday and Hasan’s account of anaphora and cohesion, and Cornish 
(2002) for an assessment of Dik’s Functional Grammar (Dik 1997, Part II: Ch. 10) treatment of discourse anaphora. 
Dik actually gives two parallel definitions of the anaphoric relation: the first in terms of a pairing of co-occurring 
expressions in a text, and the second in terms of the retrieval by the anaphor of a relevant discourse referent. So in 
fact he has a foot in both camps in this respect. It is evident, then, that the two dichotomies (textualist vs. discourse-
functional accounts of anaphora, and formalist vs. functionalist paradigms in linguistics) are not co-extensive, but 
overlap. However, it remains true that the formalist schools take a preponderantly textualist view of the phenomenon. 
2 E.g. the selection restrictions imposed by the predicate of which each is the argument, the animacy of the two 
expressions, and other properties. 
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terms of it. Discourse-functional accounts, on the other hand, start from the premise that 
the motivation for the phenomenon is indeed discourse-functional, and that this raison-
d’être should be the guiding framework in which the mechanics of its possible 
realisations are characterised.  
The pairing of referentially and/or semically asymmetrical expressions which 
allegedly makes the transfer of the antecedent’s sense and/or reference possible on the 
textualist account, typically harnesses only the co-text within the range of sub-types of 
context mentioned in §1 above (hence the appellation “textualist”). This leaves totally 
out of account the discourse underpinnings of the various types of anaphora (see 
sections 4 and 5 below): as we will see (in §2.2, §3 and infra), anaphora as well as 
deixis are essentially discourse-level referring procedures, serving to create discourse — 
by integrating discourse units in the case of anaphora, and by introducing new referents 
(or new aspects of existing ones) in the case of deixis. The textualist account also tends 
to underestimate the specific contribution to a given anaphoric relation of the particular 
type of anaphor token used to realise it —each anaphor type having a distinctive set of 
semantic and indexical properties (see Figure 1 and the discussion in §3 below). 
As far as computational accounts are concerned, Mitkov (2002) provides a 
representative synthesis. Although the author acknowledges the relevance of discourse-
pragmatic features like topicality, salience and so on, he adopts an essentially co-textual 
account of anaphora, giving preference to instances where the antecedent expression is 
an explicitly-realised NP (since anaphoric relations of this kind are the most tractable 
computationally). In the algorithms defined, pride of place is given to formal constraints 
(e.g. morphological feature-matching where the anaphor is pronominal, syntactic 
constraints of various kinds, as well as lexical ones —animacy, selection restrictions, 
etc.).  In his formulations in the book, the author reveal his allegiance to the co-textual 
account in writing of given anaphors “pointing” to their textual antecedent (e.g. Mitkov, 
2002: 12, 13, 14). Equivalently, he writes (p. 14) of anaphors “refer[ring] back to (or 
replac[ing]) a previously mentioned item”.  See also p. 23 for further such references. In 
endnote 7 to Chapter 1 (p. 24), the author observes in connection with the term anaphor 
resolution that “it would be logical to say that the anaphor is resolved to its 
antecedent…”.   
According to Mitkov’s survey, the algorithms proposed for the automatic 
resolution of anaphors have tended to give priority to local, formal constraints 
(morphological agreement in gender, number and person, syntactic constraints such as 
disjoint reference configurations or c-command relations, and lexical-semantic filters 
such as selection restrictions) as well as preferences (for example, the parallel function 
heuristic whereby a candidate antecedent bearing the same syntactic function as an 
anaphor — subject, direct object, indirect object etc. — is a preferred choice).  More 
“top-down” factors such as global discourse topichood, rhetorical structure relations or 
real-world knowledge tend to be downplayed in resolution systems, due to their 
complexity, relative intractability and “expensiveness” in terms of the computational 
resources required. As Mitkov (2002: 95) points out, current anaphor resolution systems 
tend to concentrate on the use of “knowledge-poor” strategies based on the types of 
local, “bottom-up” constraints and preferences mentioned above. Moreover, such 
systems proceed in a backwards direction, starting from the anaphor and establishing a 
set of candidate antecedents first within the same clause, then the same sentence, then in 
the n clauses or sentences preceding the anaphoric clause.   
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Frequently, formalist-textualist linguists will use invented two-sentence 
examples as the basis for their analyses — the first sentence containing the “antecedent” 
(most often a human-denoting NP) and the second an anaphor which may either be 
construed as anaphoric (usually in terms of coreference) to that antecedent, or as being 
“disjoint” in reference with it.  A typical (decontextualized) instance of such examples 
is provided by Kamp & Reyle (1993:ex.  0.66): 
 
 (2) a Jonesi owns Ulyssesj. Itj fascinates himi.
3 
        b #Itj fascinates himi. Jonesi owns Ulyssesj. (alternative version of (2a)–FC) 
 
In (2a), the pronouns him and it are aligned with Jones and Ulysses, respectively, and 
thereby receive their full interpretations, since there is no c-command relation holding 
between anaphors and antecedents —the anaphors involved occurring in a separate 
independent subsequent sentence. Under the standard GB Binding theory account, if a 
pronoun c-commands its potential antecedent within a given syntactic configuration, 
then it cannot be “bound” by it (i.e. no anaphoric relation can be established between 
the two expressions, c-command being a relation between nodes within a given sentence 
structure). In (2a), as the authors explain, the inanimate pronoun it is compatible with 
Ulysses, the name of a novel, and the human-denoting, masculine pronoun him with 
Jones, a proper noun conventionally naming a (by default) male person. These 
pragmatic constraints stem from the addressee’s or reader’s knowledge of the world 
(which includes the referring conventions associated with the use of a given language   
—here, English).  However, these alignments are not possible in (2b) (my variant of 
(2a)). A modified version of (2b), however, makes the anaphoric relations signalled by 
the identity of indices somewhat more natural: 
 
 (2) c ?#Itj fascinates himi. But Jonesi doesn’t actually OWN Ulyssesj. 
 
Although this is not completely natural (this is the reason for the questioned crosshatch 
preceding the example), it is still an improvement over (2b), in terms of the anaphoric 
interpretations indicated by the indices. Below is an attested example with two 
inanimate subject pronouns in successive sentences referring cataphorically to a referent 
ostensibly introduced by a subject NP in a following independent sentence. Note that, in 
parallel with OWN in (2c) (see the discussion below), the adverb more in (2d) would 
also be assigned contrastive stress if spoken; and like the NP Ulysses in (2c), the NP the 
Mirror would be pronounced with low pitch and weak stress:  
 
(2) d “It gets scoops. It makes money. What more must The Mirror do?” (title 
of a feature article in The Observer, 19.08.07, p. 9) 
 
 (2c) corresponds to a somewhat more natural variant of (2b) to the extent that 
the connection indicated between the two sentences is tighter: such degrees of tightness 
will partly be determined by the prosody with which they may be uttered –prosody 
being a contextualizing device par excellence. If the initial, anaphoric sentence is 
pronounced with continuative (rising) and not conclusive (falling) intonation, with 
extra-high pitch and contrastive stress on own in the second sentence and Ulysses 
                                                
3 The indices are my addition here. 
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consequently unstressed and pronounced in a low level-tone, the pause between the two 
sentences being minimal, then the first sentence will be presented as pragmatically 
subordinate in relation to the second —belying its grammatical status as an independent 
sentence.4 The sequence of two sentences is then equivalent to a period, prosodically 
(“an integrative clausal unit characterised by a conclusive intoneme”, in Simon’s 2004: 
232 words – my translation, FC), and not to two separate periods, as in (2b). Unlike 
(2b), the example may have the possible interpretation “In spite of the fact that he is 
fascinated by it, it is not the case that Jones owns (a copy of) the novel Ulysses”. This 
represents the discourse that may be associated with the text under this prosodic 
configuration, in my terms (see Table 1).  
In discourse terms, there is an evident coherence relation available in the case of 
example (2a) (that of Explanation, or at a minimum, Elaboration) in terms of which the 
discourse units derivable from each sentence may be integrated into a larger unit —the 
second sentence being construable either as the potential “Cause” of the situation 
evoked by the first, or as simply giving further information about it.5  In the case of 
(2b), on the other hand, no such relation is evident: each of the two sentences appears to 
be a semantic isolate; so no semantic-pragmatic “scaffolding” is available to help 
integrate the discourse derivable from each unit and thus resolve the anaphors in the 
first.  
In (2c), by contrast, where the anaphors and antecedents occupy the same 
relative linear positions and fulfil the same grammatical functions as in (2b), the 
pragmatic subordination of the first sentence in relation to the second induced by the 
discourse connective But prefacing the latter, as well as the negation of its predication, 
invoke a Concession coherence relation in terms of which each unit might be integrated. 
This then facilitates the resolution of the anaphors in the first in terms of the relevant 
referentially-independent NPs in the second. In (2d), likewise, the discourse derived 
through the integration via cataphora and the prosodic realisation indicated above, 
would also make use of the Concession relation. Informally, this discourse would be as 
follows (resolving the rhetorical question bearing a negative value in the third sentence 
in this context): “In spite of the facts that The Mirror gets scoops and makes money, it 
is not clear what else it can do (to survive as a commercial concern)”. So discourse-
semantic factors “come to the rescue” of otherwise problematic textual-syntactic 
configurations, contextualizing each unit in terms of the other. See the text/discourse 
distinction displayed in Table 1 above.   
A comparison between the impossible realization (2b) and the almost natural 
(2c) (as well as the completely natural (2d)) shows that there are other factors over and 
above the types of expression involved in the relation and their relative positions in the 
co-text which favour or disfavour a given anaphoric interpretation in context. It is the 
application of at least one coherence relation to integrate two discourse units which 
                                                
4 Clearly, if the NP Ulysses had received a pitch accent, then the discourse created via this textualization would be 
incoherent.  The same applies to the NP The Mirror in (2d). 
5 The understander will invoke the pragmatically strongest coherence relation to integrate two discourse units, 
subsuming a weaker textual or semantic relation, where more than one is possible simultaneously. Explanation, being 
a pragmatically-based coherence relation, is “stronger” than Elaboration, a semantic one. See Cornish (2009b: §4.1 
and §5) for relevant discussion. 
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results in the full pragmatic interpretation (i.e. “resolution”) of a discourse anaphor 
contained in one of them.6 
  
2.2 The discourse-functional approach to anaphora 
 
More functionally-oriented linguists (though not all of them, as we noted in §2.1), on 
the other hand, tend to conceive anaphora in terms of the discourse job it performs: 
maintaining the reference or sense (or indeed, both) of its “antecedent”, which takes 
account of the dynamic nature of a discourse. Indeed, if one envisages language use in 
terms of the speaker’s attempting to influence his or her addressee(s) in specific ways, 
in interaction with them, then anaphora (and its close neighbour, deixis) takes on a 
rather different character: see section 3 for a characterisation in discourse-functional 
terms. It is no wonder, then, that there should be a major divergence in approach 
between the two schools, since each is in fact dealing with a somewhat different object 
of investigation.  This major point is actually touched on implicitly by Huang (2000:15) 
himself, when he observes that “One general distressing feature of the 1980’s has been 
the widening gap between formal syntacticians and discourse analysts. As a corollary, 
the investigation of discourse anaphora has in general been ignored or positively 
opposed in formal syntax.”  
In broader terms, the functionalist approach to language structure and use is 
neatly summed up by Nichols (1984: 97), quoted by Newmeyer (1998: 10):  
 
[Functional grammar] analyzes grammatical structure, as do formal and structural grammar, but 
it also analyzes the entire communicative situation: the purposes of the speech event, its 
participants, its discourse context. Functionalists maintain that the communicative situation 
motivates, constrains, explains, or otherwise determines grammatical structure, and that a 
structural or formal approach is not merely limited to an artificially restricted data base, but it is 
inadequate even as a structural account.  
 
The key point here is that “grammatical structure” (part of what I am treating as 
text) is seen as an integral part of the “speech event”. Thus, in conjunction with the 
assignment of an appropriate prosodic structure and the invocation of a context, it 
contributes to realising that speech event. The textual realisation, then, is not reified as 
the sole frame of reference for the analysis (as in the formalist-textualist account), but is 
conceived as playing an enabling role in relation to what I am calling discourse (“the 
purposes of the speech event”, in the quotation from Nichols, 1984 above).  
As regards anaphora, Huang’s second group of linguists (the “discourse 
analysts” in the penultimate quotation) conceive of it as constituting a reference-
maintenance device or procedure which operates upon memory representations in real 
(processing) time. These representations are assumed to enjoy certain specific cognitive 
statuses at the point of retrieval (e.g. “in-focus”, activated and so on). The textual 
“antecedent”, which may well not be present at all in the natural-discourse instances 
chosen for analysis by proponents of this approach,7 is not central to such analyses, but 
is merely the “source” or origin of the reference of later anaphors. The interpretation of 
these is a function not only of the reference of the “antecedent” at the point in the 
                                                
6 Cf. Hobbs’s (1979, 1990) hypothesis on the symbiotic relationship between the invocation of given coherence 
relations to integrate two discourse units, and the resolution of anaphors contained in one of these; see also Cornish 
(2009b) for a critical development of this thesis. 
7 See examples (14), (15) and (17) below for three attested instances of this. 
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discourse at which it occurred, but also of what will have been predicated of the 
antecedent’s referent downstream of its occurrence. Anaphora under this approach does 
not operate solely at the level of the co-text,8 but at the level of discourse-memory 
representations. Here is a typical discourse-functional definition of the anaphora/deixis 
distinction:  
 
(3) a “Deixis is a linguistic9 means for achieving focusing of the hearer’s 
attention towards a specific item which is part of the respective (sic) 
deictic space”. (Ehlich, 1982: 325) 
   b “Anaphora is a linguistic means for having the hearer continue (sustain) a 
previously established focus towards a specific item on which he had 
oriented his attention earlier”. (Ehlich, 1982: 330) 
 
These definitions are framed in terms of what speakers and hearers are actually 
doing collaboratively in the process of communication, and do not make reference to 
any relation between co-occurring expression tokens in the co-text. However, they need 
to be refined by specifying what types of “linguistic means” may realise these two 
discourse-referring procedures, and what constitutes attention-focussing (definition 
(3a)) as well as a previously-established attention focus (definition (3b)). This is the 
purpose of sections 3-5 below.  
Discourse analysts also tend to study corpus-based rather than constructed data 
subject to the analyst’s intuitions, and take into account more centrally than do the 
formal-syntactic approaches the context surrounding the utterances under study.10  The 
co-text is important in this kind of approach insofar as it provides constraints on what 
may be part of the relevant memory representation, and on the saliency level of that 
representation at the point of introduction as well as of retrieval. But it is simply one 
input to the discourse representations constructed as a result of the contextualisation, 
interpretation and integration of the information derived. Furthermore, the distribution 
of tokens of a variety of different types of indexical expression (whether expressing a 
type of deixis or of anaphora) throughout a given text is symptomatic of the structure of 
the discourse which may be associated with the text at hand.11 
The concentration on resolution in terms of specifying the possible extension of 
given anaphors in textualist accounts excludes from the purview the crucial 
interpersonal dimension of anaphora (as well as deixis), which of course falls under the 
“discourse”, not primarily the “textual” dimension of language use: see section 3 in 
particular on this aspect. For it is well-known that while deixis is the source of reference 
itself (Lyons 1975) and involves an essentially egocentric, subjective stance on the 
speaker’s part (though overlain by social-cultural factors: see Hanks 2009 in particular 
                                                
8 I.e. involving the bringing into relation of two or more co-occurring expressions. 
9 I would take issue with Ehlich, however, on the purported restriction of deixis to expression via linguistic means 
(though this is no doubt a correct characterization as far as anaphora is concerned). After all, deixis may well be 
realized via a gesture, or prosodically via a high pitch accent (where this is under the control of the speaker, and is not 
necessarily “imposed” on him/her by the structure of the language being used). See section 3 below. 
10 For example, their interactional and communicative dimensions, and the degree and kind of attention coordination 
which their features may reflect as between speaker/writer and addressee/reader. 
11 See for example Cornish (2008) for an analysis of the discourse-structuring functions of tokens of a range of 
indexical expression types across three texts (spoken as well as written) from different genres (a newspaper article, an 
advertisement and an oral eye-witness account of a natural disaster). See also Adam’s (2005:92) analysis of his 
French textual example (T28). 
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on this aspect), anaphora is mastered much later by children, in ontogenetic terms.  This 
is because its appropriate use in discourse requires the user to assess the current state of 
the addressee’s pragmatic knowledge store, in terms of what s/he is supposing to be 
uppermost in his/her consciousness at the point of utterance, and what backgrounded. 
That is, the user must be capable of setting up a rather sophisticated psycho-social 
representation of the communication process. This crucial interpersonal dimension is 
what characterises the use of anaphora as well as deixis; and yet it tends to be left 
wholly out of account by proponents of the co-textual account of these procedures. 
The frameworks in which the formal-syntactic (textualist) and the discourse-
pragmatic approaches are operating in the analysis of anaphora are thus very different: 
co-textual and competence- or system-based in the former case, message/discourse 
memory and performance- or usage-oriented in the latter. It is therefore no wonder that, 
in Huang’s (2000:15) words, “there has been [a] widening gap between formal 
syntacticians and discourse analysts”.  
 
3. Deixis and anaphora: the discourse-functional view 
 
A word now on some of the basic differences and similarities between the discourse 
procedures of deixis and anaphora —complementary referential procedures involving 
pointing in context (‘indexicality’). The user exploits these procedures in order to 
construct, modify and access the contents of mentally-represented models of an 
unfolding discourse. This discourse is represented in the minds of speaker and addressee 
—or writer and reader in the written form of language: see Table 1 above. Both 
procedures operate as a function of the principle of “Recipient Design” (see Bell, 1991 
in relation to media discourse), and serve to ensure the coordination of the speaker’s and 
addressee’s attention (cf. Clark & Bangerter, 2004 and Verhagen, 2005 in relation to the 
act of referring more generally).  
Deixis serves prototypically to orientate the addressee’s attention focus towards 
a new discourse entity —or to a new aspect of an already-existing discourse referent — 
which is derived by default via the context of utterance, whose centre point is the hic et 
nunc of the speaker’s verbal and non-verbal activity (see also Diessel, 2006:470). 
Deixis under this conception entails the exploitation of the utterance context —the 
deictic ground, in Hanks’, 1992 terminology— in order to profile a figure: a new 
referent or a new conception of an existing referent within the discourse memory. We 
have to do with deixis every time we need to have recourse (by default) to the context of 
utterance in order to identify the referent intended by the speaker. However, this is only 
a necessary, not a sufficient condition, since “exophoric” reference may be anaphoric 
rather than deictic in character: see examples (5) and (15) below. 
The use of the deictic referring procedure always entails a break in the continuity 
of the discourse up to that point, due to the fact that the user needs to have recourse to 
the circumstances of utterance in order to pick out the intended referent.  Deixis may be 
realised via gestures alone (e.g. a pointing gesture or gaze direction), via a pitch accent 
in the spoken form, or via the appropriate use of particular types of indexical 
expressions: 1st or 2nd person pronouns, 3rd-person demonstrative pronouns, adverbs or 
NPs, for example — or indeed, via a combination of tokens of these types of device.  
As for anaphora, the occurrence of an anaphor together with the clause in 
which it occurs as a whole constitutes a signal to continue the focus of attention 
established —or assumed to be established— at the point of use (see Ehlich’s definition 
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in (3b) above); in this way, the referents of weakly-accented or unaccented, low-pitched 
anaphors, which are thus phonologically non-prominent, are presupposed to enjoy a 
relatively high degree of attention focus for the addressee at the point of use. Anaphora 
consists in the retrieval via a referentially-dependent expression token from within a 
given ground (the representation of a situation of some kind) of an already-existing 
figure (a central entity) together with its ground, the anaphoric predication serving to 
extend that ground (see also Kleiber 1994:Ch. 3).   
Arguably, it is a mistake to consider, as is often stated, that deixis necessarily 
involves reference outside the text, to something which is part of or is in some way 
connected with the context of utterance,12 while anaphora is ipso facto a reference to a 
segment of the co-text. For in both cases, it is the conceptualisation or mental, 
psychological representation of the referents which is at stake, whether these referents 
have been made available initially via the external situation or by the preceding (or 
indeed, succeeding) co-text. At all events, there exist different “fields” or domains of 
reference13 on which both the deictic and anaphoric procedures may operate:  
 
- the utterance situation  
canonical deixis: (4) A to B: Hey, look at that! (uttered with a pointing 
gesture towards a strange bird perched on the branch of a tree near the 
interlocutors). 
anaphora (more accurately, “exophora”): (5) [A and B turn a corner on the 
pavement, and suddenly find themselves face to face with a rather large dog] 
A to B: Do you think it’s friendly? (Cornish, 1999: ex. 4.1, p. 112). 
 
- the co-text  
textual deixis: (6) A: Our rhododendrons are in blossom right now. B: Oh 
really? How do you spell that, by the way?  
anaphora: (7) B: …I know it’s got three “d”’s. 
 
- the discourse already created or anticipated  
discourse deixis: (8) A: Listen to this: a man went into a butcher’s shop one 
day wanting to buy a whole sheep, and…  
anaphora : (9) A: …Would you believe it? 
 
- shared long-term memory 
anadeixis: (10) A: Do you remember that holiday we had two years ago in 
the Bahamas? 
anaphora: (11) B: I do indeed. It was the best we had in years! 
  
In the case of the anaphoric (“exophoric”) functioning of the pronoun it in (5) 
above, the essential difference in comparison to the conditions prevailing in the deictic 
use of that in (4) is that the intended referent’s existence as well as saliency is 
presupposed in the former case, but asserted in the second (see Cornish 1999:Ch.4 for 
discussion of exophora). Unlike Mitkov (2002:10), I would not characterise the use of 
                                                
12 This is often the conception assumed by those linguists who take an essentially co-textual view of anaphora.  Cf. 
for example Mitkov (2002: §1.11, pp. 20-21). 
13 See Bühler’s (1982/1934) notion of Zeigfelder [pointing fields] in this respect. 
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the pronoun it in (5) (or of he in (15) below) as “deictic”, simply because the intended 
referent exists outside the co-text, in the utterance situation, and has not been previously 
mentioned. The discourse-cognitive account of anaphora as well as the characterisation 
above distinguishes anaphora from deixis partly in terms of the status of the intended 
referent in the participants’ mental models of the discourse: already the object of an 
attention focus in the case of an anaphoric reference, but not yet so in that of a deictic 
one. See Ehlich’s definition (3b) in this regard. 
As far as textual deixis is concerned, the “field” is evidently the co-text: see 
example (6) above. The reference here is deictic and not anaphoric in character, since 
the speaker is not retrieving the referent of the textual antecedent (‘the speaker’s 
rhododendrons’), but is specifically directing his or her addressee’s attention towards 
the head lexeme’s form qua form within that antecedent(-trigger) (rhododendrons). 
Textual deixis is not an instance of “exophora”, as Diessel (1999:101) claims it is, but, 
as its very name indicates, involves orienting the addressee’s attention towards a 
relevant feature of the co-text. After all, when we refer (and predicate) in natural 
language use, we are focussing upon the referents of our referring expressions, not, 
under normal circumstances, on their phonetic or graphical form.  
With discourse deixis, on the other hand, it is the surrounding discourse which 
has just been constructed (or which is on the point of being constructed, in the case of 
example (8)), which is operated upon by the addressee to appropriate the intended 
referent. The effect of the use of the proximal demonstrative pronoun in (8) is to open a 
discourse slot or space which is flagged as shortly to be filled by the story about to be 
recounted. See (18) in section 5 below for an attested example of (backward-looking) 
discourse deixis. Arguably, the fourth type of field indicated above —often known as 
“recognitional deixis” in the literature: see example (10) above— involves both 
anaphora (in the sense that an existing discourse representation is retrieved from long-
term memory) and deixis (via the use of the utterance situation to point to a 
representation embedded in shared, long-term memory). This would be an instance of 
“anadeixis”: see Fig. 1 below. But this reference is more clearly deictic than anaphoric, 
since the addressee’s attention cannot be assumed already to be focused upon the 
intended referent here.  
Clearly, both deixis and anaphora may operate on the context of utterance 
(situated “outside” the text, then), on the co-text, on the surrounding discourse, or on 
shared long-term memory representations. In fact, this is only true in terms of the 
immediate sources of the indexical reference involved: for in all cases, deixis as well as 
anaphora operate in terms of the discourse representations of the relevant fields. But the 
nature of each type of referring procedure is clearly distinct.  
Figure 1 below is an attempt to range various categories of indexical expressions 
on a Scale of indexicality in terms of their relative degrees of inherent deicticity and 
anaphoricity (see also Consten, 2003 for a similar view14). The indexical expression 
types retained are indicated in terms of their category type, and not in terms of the 
actual forms involved (unlike in the case of the similar Scales presented by Gundel et 
al., 1993: 275, item (1) and Ariel, 1996: 21, item (11) in terms of the degree of 
cognitive accessibility coded by the forms concerned), since each category type may 
sustain various different types of use in context. In both Gundel et al’s and Ariel’s 
                                                
14 However, as will be apparent, I do not share Consten’s claim in this chapter that there is no essential or useful 
distinction to be made between ‘deixis’ and ‘anaphora’. 
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Scales, each lexical or phrasal form type retained is assumed to have one particular use 
(more than one for specified forms in Gundel et al.’s hierarchy) —normally, the 
“default” one for each type. See Kaiser (2005) for a critique of the notion of ‘saliency’ 
assumed by scales such as these. Kaiser argues from the behaviour of certain Finnish 
anaphors (hän, a 3rd person gender-neutral pronoun, and tämä, a proximal demonstrative 
pronoun which may target human referents) that different types of indexical presuppose 
different types of saliency in their potential referents at the point of use, and thus that 
there is no single unitary scale of saliency such as those postulated by Gundel et al or by 
Ariel. Her general approach is very much in line with the Scale proposed in Figure 1, 
which is founded upon the inherent indexical properties of each category retained.  
 
Deixis                                    Anaphora 
 
      
   
         1st/2nd pp  >  Pdm adv >  [Ddm adv >  Pdm NP  >  Ddm NP >  Pdmp >  Ddmp >  Df NP] > 3rdpp >  3rd pRp24         
                                  <-------------------------------anadeixis----------------------------->               
 
Figure 1: Scale of anaphoricity and deicticity coded by certain categories of indexical expressions 
(Cornish 2007: Fig. 1, p. 149) 
  
The parallel unbroken lines ending in arrows pointing towards each pole are intended to 
indicate that deixis and anaphora are not mutually exclusive, ‘absolute’ indexical 
categories, but that the majority of the various indexical expression types which may 
realise them share both properties, albeit to differing degrees. After all, several types of 
indexical expression may have either a deictic or an anaphoric function in a given 
context —e.g. distal demonstrative adverbs, 3rd person demonstrative pronouns and 
determiners, and definite NPs; and in their anaphoric use, demonstrative-based 
expressions may have a partly-deictic, partly-anaphoric (i.e. “anadeictic”, see Ehlich, 
1982:333-4) function in referring contextually. As is well known, anaphora is derivative 
upon deixis (see for example, Lyons, 1975; Diessel, 1999:110-113), the latter referring 
procedure taking precedence over it both phylogenetically and ontogenetically. In 
recognition of this relationship, the hierarchy shows an overlap in the middle between 
the two poles of pure deixis and pure anaphora: see the segment delimited by the 
square-brackets termed “anadeixis” in Figure 1.  High pitch and heavy stress placed on 
a token of a given expression type (e.g. 3rd person pronouns) move it one position higher 
towards the ‘Deixis’ pole on the scale.  
The rationale for the hierarchy lies in the degree of inherent deicticity of each 
individual indexical category retained. The two poles are occupied, respectively, by 1st 
and 2nd person personal pronouns, which are primary deictics and may not function 
anaphorically (contrary to what is stated in Martin 1992: 127–8 for I/me/my, at least), 
and by 3rd person reflexive pronouns, which (at least when unstressed in English) 
function only anaphorically within a highly constrained clause-bound context. 1st and 2nd 
person pronouns are inherently deictic in that their use by a speaker quasi-automatically 
selects the current speaker and the current intended addressee, respectively. The 
repetition by a given speaker of a 1st and 2nd person pronoun within his or her 
conversational turn selects that speaker anew as the referent of the occurrence of the 1st 
person pronoun, and, in conjunction with a gaze or other gesture, the intended 
addressee(s) —who may thereby be different from the one(s) determined earlier. Such 
repetitions may in no way be viewed as anaphoric in function, as maintaining a previous 
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reference.15  The referring potential of these two expression types is thus more highly 
constrained than their 3rd person demonstrative counterparts (demonstrative adverbs, 
pronouns and determiners).  
The demonstrative-based expression types ranged in between the two polar 
categories are ordered in terms of the proximal (marked) vs. distal (unmarked) 
distinction which they carry morphologically —the marked counterpart bearing a higher 
degree of deicticity than its unmarked one. See in this regard Gundel et al’s (1993:275) 
Givenness Hierarchy (Figure 2 below), where the proximal demonstrative NP this N (in 
its “indefinite”, that is, new-referent-evoking use) is placed to the right end of the Scale, 
just to the left of the polar indefinite NP type a N —which is the least context-bound of 
all the expression types recognized on this Scale, coding the status “type identifiable”. 
The Givenness Hierarchy places each cognitive status retained on a scale of alleged 
increasing restrictiveness of the mental representations associated with each position: 
from the least context-bound (“type-identifiable”, coded by the indefinite article to the 
extreme right of the GH), to the most (“in-focus”, coded by 3rd person pronouns at the 
extreme left).  
 
in focus > activated > familiar > uniquely 
identifiable 
> referential > type 
identifiable 
it  that/this 
this N 
 that N  the N  indef. this N  a N 
 
Figure 2. Gundel et al.’s (1993:275) “Givenness Hierarchy” 
 
But other demonstrative determiner types are placed at several points removed 
from this type (that N — “familiar” —two places to the left, and this N again —here 
bearing either a deictic or an “anadeictic” referential value in context, and coding the 
status “activated”—one place further to the left of this determiner type).  The advantage 
of the Scale presented in Fig. 1 is that the relative degree of cognitive accessibility of 
the potential referents of each category represented follows from its basic inherent 
degree of deicticity and of anaphoricity. Thus these degrees of accessibility are not 
simply “stipulated” as such for each form type, as seems to be the case in Gundel et al’s 
and Ariel’s Hierarchies.  
On the Scale in Fig. 1, the demonstrative adverbs (e.g. now/then, here/there) are 
placed at a higher position than the NPs (since they are potentially “token-reflexive” 
items, like the 1st and 2nd person pronouns), and the NPs higher than the corresponding 
pronouns. All demonstrative-based categories are placed above the definite NP 
category: I have placed definite NPs at the lower limit of the “anadeictic” span in Figure 
1, since though they are not always indexical in function,16 they may yet occur 
deictically as well as anaphorically. Their inherent degree of deicticity is thus lower 
than the demonstrative-based categories retained, but higher than (unstressed) 3rd person 
pronouns, which are normally restricted to the anaphoric function.  
                                                
15 If there is ‘coreference’ between repeated instances of 1st and 2nd person pronouns, it is coreference without 
anaphora (as in the case of repeated full proper nouns or full definite NPs, which are referentially-autonomous and 
not referentially-dependent expression types). This is because 1st and 2nd person pronouns are primary deictic 
expressions, which refer “token-reflexively” (via the user’s needing to have recourse to the circumstances of their 
very use on each occasion). 
16 They may refer independently in terms of their lexical content when this is sufficient to uniquely identify their 
referent. 
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4. Discourse-functional determinants of anaphora: the integrative role of 
coherence relations 
 
The (traditional) conception of anaphora outlined in the quotations from Huang (2000) 
and Barss (2003) in §2.1 (items (1a) and (1b)) is essentially a static one: it is tacitly 
assumed by proponents of this conception that the referent of the “antecedent” 
expression is uniquely determined via the lexical content of this expression, together 
with the instruction as to the identification of its referent conveyed by the determiner, 
where there is one; and that it is this referent together with the lexical content of the 
head noun and any complement(s) and/or modifiers, which serves to determine both the 
sense and the reference of the anaphor when it occurs, once the two expressions are 
brought into relation one with another. However, this is an idealisation which bears little 
relation to the way in which anaphora is actually interpreted in real texts. Let’s examine 
a recipe, from a “directive” genre of language use, to illustrate. The clauses are 
numbered for convenience. 
 
(12)  “Lobster with warm potato, shallot and tarragon salad 
(1)Slice 200g new potatoes into thinnish discs. (2)Simmer ø until al dente. 
(3)Split a cooked lobster lengthways, (4)and make a dressing with 1 tbs red 
wine vinegar, 2.5 tbs extra-virgin olive oil, 2 diced shallots, tarragon, salt 
and pepper. (5)Drain the potatoes, (6)and dress ø. (7)Serve ø with the lobster 
and lemon wedge.”  Recipe 24, The Observer Food Monthly supplement, 
August 2007, n° 77, p. 34.  
 
This text is characterised by a sequence of short, compact sentences, with the verbs all 
in imperative mood form. The only mode of connection between clauses is 
via coordination, and there is frequent use of zero pronouns in object positions. Each 
clause of this short text corresponds to a particular procedure, a stage in the preparation 
of the dish under consideration. What is of course crucial to an understanding of this 
text is the particular predications in each clause denoting the culinary operations to be 
applied to the initially raw ingredients. The genre imposes that each predication denote 
an operation to be applied in sequence to the result of the immediately preceding one; 
indeed, there is a single type of coherence relation adopted to integrate the discourse 
associated with each clause: “Sequence”. Thus in the first clause, the raw new potatoes 
will be conceptualised as having been “sliced into thinnish discs”; in the second, as 
having been simmered until still firm (“al dente”); in the fifth, as having been removed 
from the saucepan17 and the water drained from them; in the sixth, as covered with the 
dressing specified in the fourth clause; and finally, in the seventh, as having the split, 
cooked lobster already prepared added to them and presented for consumption.    
Now, if we take the discourse constructed by the reader as intended by the 
writer here into account (as of course we must), in addition to the text18 then clearly, the 
occurrences of the relevant anaphoric expressions (the null pronouns in clauses 2, 6 and 
                                                
17 Not explicitly mentioned, but implied by the imperative transitive verb form simmer in clause 2. 
18 The purely perceptual signs (the verbal content) and signals (the punctuation and any added graphic marks 
including page layout etc. inritten form, as here) that form a text. See Table 1 for my conception of the distinction 
between text and discourse. I have italicized the indexical expressions (null pronouns and definite NPs) in this text. 
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7, and the definite NP the potatoes in clause 5) will not be interpreted in terms of the 
referent of the antecedent expression 200g new potatoes in clause 1. This is because we 
need to take account of what will have been done to these initially raw, intact 
ingredients at each relevant stage in the preparation of the dish at issue. Thus what will 
be “simmered until al dente” in clause 2 is not the intact, raw, unscrubbed and 
unwashed new potatoes introduced in clause 1, but the circular, thinly sliced segments 
of the potatoes (presumably scrubbed and washed) whose representation will have been 
created via the operation prescribed in clause 1 as a whole. In clause 5, the anaphoric, 
reduced definite NP the potatoes clearly refers to the result of the operation prescribed 
in clause 2: the firm, simmered, thinly-sliced pieces of the original potatoes. It would be 
a serious error of interpretation to understand the potatoes in clause 5 as referring to the 
original raw, unsliced, unsimmered (that is, not yet boiled in water) and unpeeled set of 
potatoes introduced in clause 1 —i.e. the referent of the textual antecedent—, just as it 
would be to interpret the null object of simmer in clause 2 as referring back to this set. 
Yet this is precisely what the co-textual account of discourse anaphora entails. The 
resulting preparation would certainly not be acceptable as a dish put before the guests 
on the dinner table!   
 Similarly, the reduced definite NP the lobster in clause 7 will be understood as 
referring back to the result of the operation on the (cooked) lobster introduced in clause 
3: the fact that it will have been “split lengthways”, and not simply as maintaining the 
referent of the indefinite NP a cooked lobster from within that clause. All the textual 
antecedent does in such instances is determine the ontological category of entity which 
the anaphor’s referent presupposes. In (12), these are, respectively, ‘potato’ and 
‘lobster’: both are cases of the ontological category “Instance” in Fraurud’s (1996) 
typology of referents. But the referent itself may differ in a number of ways. See Brown 
& Yule (1983) for very similar criticisms of the co-textual account of anaphora, notably 
in relation to Halliday & Hasan’s (1976) conception of anaphora (“reference”) in terms 
of their concept of cohesion.  
In Martin (1992:140–153), a work also written within the Systemic-Functional 
framework, “participant identification” is modelled in terms of individual dependency 
relations obtaining, not uniquely between anaphors and their textual antecedent, but 
between successive references in a text relating given occurrences of a (coreferential) 
anaphor and the previous retrieval via an anaphor. The account is still an essentially 
text-based one (in that discourse interpretation is founded upon (a series of) pair-wise 
text-internal relations between an anaphor and an immediately preceding antecedent, or 
between an anaphor and the most recent coreferring anaphor); but some concession is 
nevertheless made to the undeniable fact that each successive retrieval of a given 
referent has a somewhat different interpretation (taking account of what will have been 
predicated of that referent in the clauses following its introduction). 
However, as in text (12) above, there are often predications that apply in 
between successive anaphoric retrievals of a particular referent, which thereby alter the 
speaker’s/writer’s (and addressee’s/reader’s) conception of that referent. Linked to this 
point, no real acknowledgement is given of the separate existence of a level of discourse 
interpretation and representation, as is claimed to be essential here. 
See Butler (2003, Part II: 303–306) for a discussion of the ‘text’/‘discourse’ 
distinction in relation to various functionalist theories of language. As Butler points out 
(p. 303), “Halliday (1994: 366) himself appears to equate ‘text linguistics’ with ‘the 
study of discourse’, and Chafe (1992: 356) … states that “[b]oth terms [‘text’ and 
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‘discourse’ — FC] may refer to a unit of language larger than the sentence: one may 
speak of a ‘discourse’ or a ‘text’.” The problem posed for the textualist description of 
anaphora by instances of “evolving reference” as illustrated in (12) stems from the fact 
that the “discourse” dimension (in the sense adopted here) is left out of account.  
 Here are two other texts, this time short “news-in-brief” newspaper articles. 
First, (13):  
 
(13)  “Paulson offered treasury role 
President Bush nominated Henry Paulson, the chief executive of 
Goldman Sachs, as US treasury secretary in place of John Snow. The 60-
year-old investment banker is a China expert and keen environmentalist.” 
The Guardian Weekly 9-15/06/06, p. 2 
 
(13) belongs to the sub-genre of expository news articles (more specifically, that of 
broadsheet newspaper “news-in-brief ” articles). The predominant grammatical mood 
used in this sub-genre is declarative, as here. The use of expanded definite and 
demonstrative NPs as resumptive anaphors is one of the hallmarks of this subgenre. 
Here, the expanded definite NP the 60-year-old investment banker clearly refers back to 
the referent introduced via the proper name Henry Paulson in the initial sentence. In 
principle, it could also refer back to ‘John Snow’, also introduced in that sentence. But 
the first individual is clearly marked as having (macro-)topic status via this sentence.19  
Even though the definite NP the 60-year-old investment banker is informationally 
specific and not general, it is nevertheless referentially dependent (the effect, in part, of 
the definite article here) — the hallmark of an indexical function. The reason for its 
being expanded (“60-year-old”) is the journalist’s typical desire to pack new 
information into definite or demonstrative NPs whose vocation is to maintain a previous 
reference (this is partly a reflection of the genre-specific need for brevity, and partly of 
the concern to achieve greater impact and “newsworthiness”) —a characteristic feature 
of news journalism. So in fact it is presupposed —or at least, the journalist is presenting 
this information as if it were so for the reader— that the individual referred to is “a 60-
year-old investment banker”. It is this factor which makes the definite NP referentially 
dependent and not autonomous —as canonical definite descriptions beloved of logicians 
and language philosophers, of the type the author of Waverley, the present Queen of 
Britain and the Commonwealth, etc., would be.  
Moreover, the discourse unit corresponding to the second sentence would be 
integrated with the first in terms of the coherence relation (Entity-)Elaboration, 
providing as it does further information regarding the macro-topical individual at issue 
here: given the stative aspectual as well as predicative character of this sentence (which 
corresponds to a “categorical”, not a “thetic” utterance), it serves to attribute a further 
property to Henry Paulson. This “elaboration” is made possible via the co-reference 
between the two NPs concerned in this short text. The strongly-favoured (Entity-
)Elaborative relation motivating the integration of these two discourse units in fact 
imposes the retrieval by the anaphor of this referent: for in the case of the other 
potential referent, the second unit would not “elaborate” the first (since neither the latter 
                                                
19 Its exponent NP fulfils the nuclear direct object function, whereas that of the second realizes a more peripheral 
function as complement of a preposition. In addition, the introduction of the former referent is expanded via an 
identifying NP in apposition with it. Furthermore, the name of this referent appears in subject position in the very title 
of the article.  These are co-textual cues to the discourse status of the two referents at issue here. 
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not the former is “about” the referent ‘John Snow’ at all). See Cornish (2009b) on the 
question of the interdependence of the operation of integrative coherence relations and 
anaphora in the creation of discourse.  
Although the NP is arguably in an anaphoric relation with the referent evoked by 
its antecedent, it adds information to the referent of the latter expression, as we have 
seen —at least, for the reader who is not already in possession of this information. In 
this case, the antecedent cannot be characterised as “the expression in terms of which 
the anaphor is interpreted”, as the co-textual account would have it —rather the reverse, 
in fact. 
Clearly then, it is in terms of the discourse derivable by the addressee or reader, 
in context, as a function of the text as well as a relevant context, that anaphora operates. 
Contrary to what is often assumed in textualist accounts, the co-text is only one 
ingredient in the establishment of an anaphoric interpretation. 
  
5. My (1999) account of the operation of anaphora in discourse revisited 
 
5.1 The “antecedent-trigger”/ “antecedent” distinction 
 
In my 1999 book on anaphora and understanding in English and French within a 
discourse context (Cornish 1999:41-51), as well as in previous and subsequent work, I 
suggested that the dual role of traditional textual antecedents be parcelled out into 
distinct constructs: the “antecedent-trigger”, on the one hand, and the “antecedent” on 
the other. A very similar term, “presupposition trigger”, is now accepted in work in 
pragmatics (see Levinson, 2000: 60, 111, for example). A canonical antecedent, after 
all, is both a co-occurring textual expression and allegedly provides the full20 
interpretation for the anaphor once the latter is brought into relation with it.  But both 
these functions need not be performed by the same expression: indeed, it is perfectly 
possible for the “antecedent-trigger” to introduce a particular referent or a sense into a 
discourse, but for the anaphor to refer back to an associated or related referent or sense 
at a later point in that discourse.  See, for instance, so-called “associative anaphora”:21 
 
(14) “As my kids have grown up, watching TV has become quite a struggle; 
you have to fight for control of the remote…” (“What I’m watching”, 
Armando Ianucci, Radio Times, 29.07.-4.08.06, p. 31) 
 
or more generally, metonymic anaphora (here “exophora”): 
 
(15) [Outside a University staff member’s office door. A student is evidently 
trying to see the staff member, but his office door is locked. Passing staff 
member to student:] “He’s not there!”22 (Example (4.3), pp. 119-20 in 
Cornish, 1999)   
 
                                                
20 Or partial, under Barss’s (2003) definition presented in §2.1 above (item (1b)). 
21 See Kleiber (2001) for a recent account in terms of French, as well as the relevant chapters in section 1 of 
Schwarz-Friesel et al. (eds.) (2007). 
22 Note that the 3rd person subject pronoun he here was pronounced with low pitch and was unstressed. It was 
therefore clearly anaphoric and not deictic in function. 
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In (14), a personal comment in a weekly radio and television magazine whose style 
corresponds to that of a casual spoken exchange, the discourse unit corresponding to the 
anaphoric clause would be integrated with the one expressed by the initial clause in 
terms of the coherence relation Claim-Evidence (see Cornish 2009b, on this relation): 
the tense-aspect of the main verb in the initial clause is the present perfect, highlighting 
the current relevance of a past state of affairs which is asserted, at the time of utterance; 
and the use of the gerundive expression (watching TV) has a generic nominal value: this 
unit is thereby signalled as corresponding to the Claim.  
The second, modalised clause provides evidence for the fact that watching TV in 
the speaker’s household is a “struggle” (note also the use of the prototypical-addressee-
denoting subject pronoun you here). The associative-anaphoric connection between the 
acts of “watching TV” and “fighting for control of the remote (control)” is provided by 
the definite elliptical NP the remote. In Barsalou’s (1992) account of frames, the remote 
control in the speaker’s household would correspond to the value of this attribute of the 
frame evoked by mention of ‘TV’ — a highly presupposed ingredient of this frame in 
today’s world. Further support for postulating a Claim-Evidence relation here comes 
from the possibility of coherently inserting one of the connectives after all or indeed in 
front of the anaphoric clause, without affecting the in-context interpretation of this 
clause in any way. 
There is no canonical textual antecedent in (15). Nonetheless, the anaphoric 
predication “He’s not there!” would be integrated with the discourse representation 
already set up contextually by the two interlocutors in terms of the coherence relation 
Explanation: informally, “student X is trying to see staff member Y, but Y’s office door 
is locked. This is because staff member Y is not in his office” (this inference is made 
possible by the conventional assumption that if a University staff member’s office is 
locked, then that staff member is not likely to be in it). What is common to the process 
of understanding both (14) and (15) is not the co-text (i.e. the co-presence of a canonical 
textual antecedent), but the discourse representation which is available to the 
understander in the immediate context of occurrence of the anaphors concerned 
(respectively, the remote and he), and the accessibility of a relevant coherence relation 
in terms of which to integrate the anaphoric predication with it.  
The antecedent-trigger, then, is not the “antecedent”, which is the in-context 
interpretation of the anaphor. This interpretation is as a function of the antecedent-
trigger, but also of the predications which will have applied to its referent downstream, 
and of the denotation of the anaphor within its immediate context. That is, it is 
determined jointly by all these three factors working together. While the antecedent 
trigger is a percept (see examples (5) and (15) above), an utterance token or a 
semiotically relevant non-verbal signal, the “antecedent” under this conception is 
relationally-determined, and is not necessarily correlatable with a particular co-
occurring expression within the co-text. See also in this respect Langacker’s (1996:342) 
brief characterisation of what I assume he is calling a “conceptual antecedent” (see 
below) in claiming that it “may specify relationships the referent bears to other entities”. 
In (14) and (15), the antecedent-triggers are, respectively, the gerundive phrase 
watching TV and the interlocutors’ focussing on the relevant staff member’s office door; 
and the “antecedents”, “the remote (control) of the TV which the speaker and his 
grown-up children are watching” and “the staff member whose office door the student 
in question is knocking on and is trying to open”. In example (12), the first antecedent 
trigger is 200g new potatoes, and the antecedent of the definite NP anaphor the potatoes 
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in clause 5, “the thin, circular, firm, simmered slices of the set of new potatoes weighing 
200g”; in the case of the antecedent-trigger a cooked lobster in clause 3, the antecedent 
of the definite NP anaphor the lobster in clause 7 will be “the cooked lobster which has 
been split lengthways”. 
 
5.2 The notion “antecedent” revisited 
 
Similar conceptions of the notion of “antecedent” I am arguing for here may be found in 
the literature on anaphora. For example, Ariel (1996:17) writes of “different antecedents 
[being] stored in the addressee’s memory in different degrees of accessibility”. For 
Ariel, an antecedent is a mental representation, and not a segment of co-text. Givón 
(1995:376) also characterises topical referents as potentially having “an accessible 
antecedent in some extant mental representation”. See also Langacker’s (1996:359-361) 
notion of “conceptual antecedent” in contrast to that of “structural antecedent” 
(analogous to my term antecedent trigger). Furthermore, Passonneau (1996:234) claims 
that “discourse entities serve to index a semantic representation constituting the current 
description of the speaker’s intended referent,” and that “these representations are 
updated as the discourse progresses.” Finally, Riley (2007: 849) claims that “[t]heir [i.e. 
anaphors’ and pronouns’] antecedents are mental representations of entities, and not just 
expressions.”  We thus take the “antecedent” to be a discourse-semantic construct, in 
terms of which the intended referent of the anaphor is described as a function of its 
salient attributes —which clearly evolve as the discourse progresses. 
The antecedent, which determines a particular discourse referent under this 
account, is constructed in this way: the head noun of the anaphor (where it is a lexically-
based one) or its animacy property where it is a pronoun, normally figures as the head 
of the semantic-pragmatic representation. The function of this head or introductory 
predicate is to specify the kind of entity which is denoted. Where referential, it is 
preceded by a definiteness operator (‘ι’), and the relational elements characterising this 
referent which have been predicated or which are presupposed of this referent up to the 
point of occurrence of the anaphor are structured around it in the manner of a (series of) 
restrictive relative clause(s).  
   
5.3 The proactive role performed by the anaphoric predication 
 
One other very important factor in the operation of anaphora is the nature of the 
anaphoric predication as a whole (see Cornish, 1999:Ch. 3 on this aspect): that is, what 
is predicated of the referent of the anaphor (which may still be unascertainable at the 
point when it is uttered) acts as a pointer towards a referent of a certain type and at the 
same time filters out otherwise possible candidate referents for that anaphor; in other 
words, it places a semantico-pragmatic constraint on its potential values. A pair of 
examples presented in Wilson (1992) makes the point very clearly (see also example 
(15) above): 
 
(16) a Sean Penn attacked a photographer. The man was quite badly hurt.  
(Wilson, 1992: 168, ex. (1b)) 
              b  Sean Penn attacked a photographer.  The man must be deranged. 
  (Wilson, 1992: 181, ex. (17)) 
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Here, each anaphoric predication most naturally continues the perspective involving a 
different discourse referent mutually available to the speech partners at the point where 
the definite subject NP of the second sentence occurs —a term which is semantically 
appropriate for retrieving either of these referents. In (16a), the (passive) predicative 
component of the anaphoric clause denotes a resulting state of a prior action: as such, its 
content can only be applied to the referent assuming the semantic role of Patient in the 
initial predication, ‘the photographer attacked by Sean Penn’. In (16b) on the other 
hand, the epistemic use of the modal auxiliary must as well as of the axiological 
predicate “(be) deranged” indicates an evaluation by the speaker of the cause of the 
attack, perpetrated by the individual responsible for it, namely ‘Sean Penn’. The above 
are my analyses.  
It is the anaphoric predication as a whole which contracts a particular coherence 
relation with the relevant context representation, so enabling the resolution of the 
anaphor and the integration of the two discourse units. In addition, the anaphoric 
predication as a discourse unit serves, as a function of its orienting role, to select the 
relevant part of the discourse representation established upstream of the anaphor with 
which the integration is to take place; that particular part of the representation need not 
be immediately adjacent in textual terms (whether just constructed, or anticipated as 
such): see as an illustration the anaphoric predications Drain the potatoes in clause 5, 
and Serve the lobster… in clause 7 in example (12) above.  
In some instances, there is no canonical textual antecedent at all, in terms of 
which the anaphor may be interpreted (see also the “exophoric” uses of 3rd person 
pronouns illustrated above by (5) and (15)). However, as elsewhere, the discourse 
context provides an appropriate interpretation:  
 
(17) “…Another guest, a tall princess, married to an erudite naturalist 
landowner called Béla Lipthay, from Lovrin in the Banat, was a 
descendant (not direct, I hope) of Pope Innocent IX of the famous house 
of Odescalchi, lords of Bracciano.* 
  * According to Sir Walter Scott (or Macaulay quoting him; I’ve searched both 
in vain and will probably come upon the passage the day after this book is out), 
Bracciano, by its reedy lake, was the best example of a mediaeval fortress he had ever 
seen…”  
 (Patrick Leigh Fermor, Between the Woods and the Water, London: John 
Murray, 2004, p. 104) 
 
In this written autobiographical narrative extract, the antecedent triggers are both the 
framing adverbial PP According to Sir Walter Scott (or Macaulay quoting him…) and 
the conjunct I’ve searched both in vain in the first and second lines of the footnote 
containing the definite NP anaphor the passage (second line of the footnote). This NP 
refers anaphorically to the contextually available referent characterisable (informally) as 
“the passage sought by Patrick Leigh Fermor in either a relevant work by Sir Walter 
Scott or by Macaulay, in which it is claimed that the castle of Bracciano was the best 
example of a mediaeval fortress the author had ever seen”.  
 In the footnote to this extract, the author of this book is described as searching 
for a particular reference to something in a book on history (that something is specified 
only in the subsequent main clause of this complex sentence). See Schwarz-Friesel 
(2007) and Cornish (2005) on the principles regulating the use of “indirect” anaphors in 
discourse.  
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Finally, one area where the difference in conception of anaphora makes itself felt 
acutely is in foreign language learning and teaching. To illustrate this, a group of 
French-speaking 3rd-year university students of English as a foreign language, who had 
been taught the conventional (text-based) account of anaphora stemming from Halliday 
& Hasan’s (1976) classic work on cohesion, were required recently to analyse the word 
that (in boldface in (18) below) in an extract from James Joyce’s “The Dead” 
(Dubliners, 1914). Part of this extract, providing relevant context for the expression at 
issue, is given in (18). The passage evokes the arrival of the guests for the Misses 
Morkans’ annual dance in Dublin.  
 
(18) “Lily, the caretaker’s daughter, was literally run off her feet. Hardly had 
she brought one gentleman into the little pantry behind the office on the 
ground floor and helped him off with his overcoat, than the wheezy hall-
door bell clanged again and she had to scamper along the bare hallway to 
5.   let in another guest. It was well for her that she had not to attend to the   
ladies also. But Miss Kate and Miss Julia had thought of that and had 
converted the bathroom upstairs into a ladies’ dressing room…”  
 
The students were asked to analyse the word that in line 6, by indicating its syntactic 
category, referential function and interpretation in context. Now, the vast majority of 
students’ answers (see the sample presented below) were in terms of the static, text-
based account of anaphora, missing the (coherent) interpretation signalled in context by 
the distal demonstrative pronoun that within the indexical clause in line 6 of this extract. 
The students concerned had been taught that there are basically two varieties of 
anaphora: “(co-)textual” or “endophora”, subsuming “anaphora” in the strict sense, 
where the antecedent precedes the anaphor in the co-text, and “cataphora”, where the 
anaphor precedes the antecedent; and “situational” (“exophora”). The preponderant 
interpretation indicated by the examinees was that the referent of the textual antecedent 
of this pronoun (namely the proposition expressed by she had not to attend to the ladies 
also in lines 5-6) corresponded to that of the demonstrative pronoun, evidently taking 
the host verb thought of in the indexical predication as meaning “cognized” (as in 
“Think of a number. Multiply it by 7…”).  In reality, this verb means something akin to 
“anticipated” here, which is a rather different interpretation (see the brief discussion of 
the relevance of contextual factors in the construction of discourse in §1.1 above). It 
also misses the discourse functioning of the adversative connective But prefacing the 
anaphoric unit. This connective has a “denial of expectation” value in context, rather 
than one evoking a straightforward contrast: what is denied here is the inference which 
may be drawn from the fact that Lily did not have to attend to the ladies, to the effect 
that no provision was made to help them off with their overcoats and allow them to get 
ready for the dance to which they were invited.   
 Here is a selection of student responses to this question (where the original 
answers were in French, I have translated them into English):  
 
- “the lexeme “that” is a demonstrative pronoun. It replaces an idea that has been mentioned 
before. It refers to the fact that Lily does not need to attend to the ladies. It has an anaphoric 
value.” 
- “(…) Its referential function is that of a proform which picks up Lily’s (sic) words, “It was 
well for her that she had not to attend to the ladies also.” That also has an anaphoric and 
endophoric value.” 
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- “In the clause ‘Miss Kate and Miss Julia had thought of that,’ (…) THAT refers (…) to the 
text, it is therefore endophoric. It has as referent the preceding sentence which is itself the 
consequence of what has been uttered at the beginning of this paragraph (…). As far as its 
precise interpretation is concerned, we may say therefore that THAT here picks up the fact 
that Lily is very busy and that it is a good thing for her not to have to worry about the ladies 
as well…”.  
- “‘that’(…) is a deictic proform (…) which [is] anaphoric, since it picks up the entire 
preceding utterance: “it was well for her that she had not to attend to the ladies also.” In 
some sense, this utterance is pronominalised by ‘that’ itself.” 
- “The syntactic category of “that” is that of (a) demonstrative – Its referential function is that 
of a proform and refers to (…) “she had not to attend to the ladies.” In this context, “that” 
makes it possible to avoid a repetition (…).” 
 
Evidently, the interpretation put forward by these students would not be coherent when 
the anaphoric clause is integrated with its discourse context: “#But Miss Kate and Miss 
Julia had thought of (= “cognized”) the fact that it was well for Lily not to have to 
attend to the ladies also and had converted the bathroom upstairs into a ladies’ dressing 
room”. If Miss Kate and Miss Julia thought it was well (a good thing) that Lily should 
not have to attend to the ladies, then it is unclear why they should have felt the need to 
“convert the bathroom upstairs into a ladies’ dressing room”.  
All the answers given above characterise the reference of that here as purely 
“anaphoric” (even though the fourth one says it is a “deictic proform”).  None of them 
picks up the fact that there is also a deictic dimension to this reference, which would 
come under the category of “anadeixis” which we saw in section 3 in particular. It is in 
fact even a “discourse-deictic” reference, since in context, its operation creates on the 
basis of a negatively-specified proposition (“Lily did not have to attend to the ladies 
also”) a quasi-generic referent characterisable informally as “the need to attend to the 
ladies who had been invited to the Misses Morkans’ annual dance in Dublin”. It is via 
the expectation-denying function of the connective But prefacing the indexical clause, 
rejecting the inference drawn from the antecedent-trigger predication to the effect that 
no provision was made for welcoming the lady guests to the annual dance, as well as via 
the character of this clause itself, that the intended referent of that is created here.  As it 
is so created, the effect is to enhance the salience level of this discourse entity, which is 
not available as such prior to the occurrence of the anadeictic demonstrative pronoun 
within its particular textual setting. Unlike Piwek et al. (2008:697), I do not believe 
discourse deixis is just a form of “anaphora”, simply because its function is to relate to 
prior (or subsequent, as in (8) above) discourse. Unlike anaphora (or indeed, strict 
“anadeixis”), with discourse deixis there is no independently existing discourse entity 
upstream “waiting” for its reference to be picked up by a discourse-deictically used 
expression. 
It is clear, then, that the co-textual expression It was well for her that she had not 
to attend to the ladies also in (18) acts as the “antecedent trigger” to the anadeictic that 
within its host clause, and cannot be construed as a simple “antecedent”, in the standard 
sense (fully determining the interpretation of an anaphorically-used pronoun). The in-
context sense “anticipated” assigned to the host verb thought of, the introductory 
function of the adversative connective but, and the import of the second conjunct and 
had converted the bathroom upstairs into a ladies’ dressing room (which contracts a 
Result coherence relation with the first) all provide support for this discourse-deictic 
interpretation. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
Arguments against the standard (traditional) account of anaphora, which holds that the 
anaphor needs to be brought into relation with an appropriate co-occurring antecedent in 
order to be assigned both a sense and a referent, include the following:  
 
• The antecedent’s referent doesn’t remain static once it is established: its 
representation in the discourse accrues and/or sheds properties as a function of 
what is predicated of it downstream of its initial occurrence; thus, the sense and 
reference of the anaphor ostensibly in relation with it may well be rather 
different (see example (12) in particular).  
• Depending on the ‘textual antecedent’ as well as anaphor involved, the anaphor 
may well contribute to the understanding of the antecedent properties which the 
latter didn’t initially have for the recipient (see example (13)).  
• Furthermore, there may well be no canonical textual antecedent at all (see 
examples (14), (15) and (17)); and yet the anaphor (in all three cases a definite 
NP or a 3rd person pronoun or pronominal determiner) may be interpreted 
without difficulty via the drawing of relevant inferences.  
• The specific indexical properties of the different types of anaphors (3rd person 
pronouns, definite NPs, both expanded and reduced, demonstrative-based 
expressions, and so on), taken in conjunction with the anaphoric predication as a 
whole, play an important role in determining the anaphor’s in-context 
interpretation (see (16) and (17) in particular). It is not the anaphor qua separate 
expression that picks up the relevant salient discourse representation at the point 
of utterance, but the entire anaphoric predication – which triggers the integration 
of the discourse unit to which it corresponds with its immediate discourse 
context in terms of an appropriate coherence relation (see the analysis of (2a,c) 
as well as of (12)-(15) above), thereby “resolving” the anaphor.  
This is the ‘discourse’ contribution to the functioning of anaphors in texts. 
The semantic-pragmatic relation holding between the discourse unit 
corresponding to the anaphoric predication and the “source” one as a function of 
the particular coherence relation invoked to integrate them, is a condition on the 
isotopy required for the anaphor’s maintenance of its source referent. See (2b) in 
this regard, where no integration seems possible between the two units involved, 
and where, as a result, the anaphors are uninterpretable. In addition, see example 
(13), where it is clear that the relation (Entity-)Elaboration induced in this 
context can only “elaborate” an entity introduced within the discourse unit 
corresponding to the first sentence, which is evidently “about” Henry Paulson, 
and not John Snow: hence it is the former referent which is the target of the 
expanded definite NP subject of the second. In the textual examples mentioned 
above, we have seen the relevance of the following coherence relation types: 
Claim-Evidence, Concession, (Entity-)Elaboration,  Explanation, Result and 
Sequence.  
• Finally, in psycholinguistic terms, it is quite implausible that hearers would need 
to keep in short-term auditory memory a particular expression (the “antecedent”) 
in order to interpret a later anaphor —which is what the co-textual account of 
anaphora would entail, of course; in the written form, this possibility is in 
principle available to readers, since the co-text remains permanently visible on 
  27 
the page. But even here, according to psycholinguists (Ehrlich & Rayner 1983; 
Charolles & Sprenger-Charolles 1989), eye regressions by readers to a relevant 
textual antecedent are relatively rare. Why? Because they are tracking the 
referents represented in their respective discourse models as the discourse is 
constructed on-line (in fact, the introduction and updating of particular discourse 
referents is an integral part of the very creation of discourse itself). The referents 
of given anaphors are not to be found “in” the text, but rather are available in (or 
via) the discourse representation.  
 
The advantage of the notion antecedent trigger in relation to the canonical 
textual antecedent is that it is more general, bringing a range of non-canonical types of 
anaphora under this type of discourse-referential procedure: as a percept, utterance 
token or semiotically relevant non-verbal signal, it will be present in cases of “evolving 
reference” (example (12)), “associative anaphora” (example (14)), exophoric anaphora 
(examples (5) and (15)), inferential or “indirect” anaphora (example (17)), discourse 
deixis (example (18)) as well as in instances of standard anaphora, where a canonical 
textual antecedent is present (in examples like (2a), (2d) and (13)). The antecedent 
trigger contributes the ontological category or type of the anaphor’s referent, but the 
actual referent itself and its characterization are determined by a variety of other factors 
(what will have been predicated of it up to the point of retrieval, the nature of the 
coherence relation invoked to integrate the units concerned, and the particular character 
of the anaphoric predication involved).  
As the examples cited above show, there are other ways than via the use of an 
explicit, textual phrase (typically, a lexically-headed NP) in which a referent may be 
introduced into a discourse, such that it may be later retrieved via an anaphoric 
expression. Whether the referent retrieved via an anaphor has been directly and 
explicitly evoked in the preceding (or succeeding, in the case of cataphora) co-text, is 
neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for the existence of anaphora.  
By separating out the two constructs antecedent and antecedent trigger, then, we 
are in a position to characterise the in-context interpretation of anaphors by highlighting 
the interaction between the complementary dimensions of text and discourse, thereby 
capturing the dynamics of discourse interpretation. As a unit of text, in the broad 
conception adopted here (see Table 1), the antecedent-trigger no longer completely 
determines the anaphor’s interpretation: the ‘antecedent’, an evolving unit of discourse, 
is now the full discourse-model representation of the anaphor’s interpretation. In this 
way, the essentially integrative, relational nature of anaphora may be captured. 
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